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1 Introduction 
 
In this paper, I investigate uses of the scalar particle still and its German 
counterpart noch which relate to the discourse (what has been said) instead of 
relating to eventualities (what has happened). (1) provides an example. 
(1) I am still your mother.            (discourse related still) 
Compare (1) to (2). In (2), the interpretive effect of the particle concerns the 
sequence of events. The addition of still puts the eventuality described in the 
sentence into perspective, relating it both to past events (earlier rain) as well as to 
possible future developments (the rain might cease). Situations in which (2) 
would be true are depicted informally in (4). 
(2) It is still raining.      (temporal continuative still) 
(3) (i) Assertion:  It is raining. 
 (ii) Presupposition: It rained at the relevant preceding time.  
 (iii) Implicature: It might stop raining./It will stop raining.  
(4) 'rain' is true of the utterance time, & 'rain' was true of an earlier abutting 
 time interval. 
 																																																								
* Thanks to Nadine Bade, Polina Berezovskaya, Saskia Brockmann, Vera Hohaus, Anna Howell, 
Konstantin Sachs, Alexander Wimmer, the participants of my seminar New Research in Semantics 
and the audience of SALT 26. This research was supported by the DFG grant to the SFB 833 
'Constitution of Meaning'. 
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      tnow 
 ---------------------------------|------|---------------> 
   ////////////////////////////// 
The interpretive impact of still in (1) is quite different. The use of still in (1) is not 
justified because I have been your mother for some time; and it does not evoke 
the possibility that I might cease being your mother. Instead, the use of still 
indicates that this is a reminder, or a reinforcement of the relevance of the fact 
that I am your mother. It relates to the preceding discourse. (1) would be 
appropriate in the context of a lengthy relationship debate. It would not normally 
be appropriate as the out of the blue start of a conversation. 
 I argue below that despite these differences, (1) and (2) involve the same 
scalar particle still. This is part of a larger plot in which I reduce the various uses 
of still and German noch 'still' to one underlying meaning (see Beck (2016, to 
appear). For (1), this plot involves arguing that discourse related uses of noch/still 
take scope above speech act operators, like ASSERT in (5). 
(5) [ForceP noch/still [ForceP ASSERT [IP I am your mother ]]] 
Discourse related uses of scalar particles have some similarity to speech act 
related uses of adverbs like frankly, as analysed in Krifka 2014. I model their 
analysis after his.  
(6) a. Frankly, your shirt and tie don't match.             (Krifka 2014) 
 b. [ForceP frankly [ForceP ASSERT [IP your shirt and tie don't match ]]] 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I sketch the analysis I adopt 
for regular uses of scalar particles, like temporal still in (2). In Section 3, I discuss 
the discourse related uses of still like (1) and also of German noch, which 
provides interesting additional data, e.g. (7). 
(7) a. context: Thilo is coming home from the supermarket. He lists a few 
        things he has bought. 
 b. Sigrid: Was  hast  Du  noch  gekauft? 
     what  have  you  still  bought 
     'What else have you bought?' 
 c. Thilo:  Ich  hab  noch  Schokolade gekauft. (order of mention noch) 
     I  have  still  chocolate  bought 
     'I have also bought chocolate.'  
The idea for an analysis introduced in Section 3 requires a framework that 
includes speech act operators, and allows them to occur embedded under 
compositional semantic material. Krifka (2014) provides such a framework. 
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Section 4 introduces the framework as well as some important motivation for it, 
and applies it to discourse related noch/still. Important questions about the 
generality of the approach are raised in Section 5 (note for example that (7b,c) do 
not translate directly into English). Section 6 is the conclusion. 
2 Continuative readings 
This section examines regular (non - discourse related) occurrences of noch/still. 
My plot is to assume the meaning in (8) for all uses of the particle. Interpretive 
variability in sentences with noch/still arises from the nature of the scale and from 
the syntactic attachment of the particle (and, less importantly for us, also from 
focus). 
(8) [[noch/still]] = λS.λx*.λx.λP<x,t>:x*∝ x & P(x*).P(x) 
 (i)  Assertion:  P(x) - the predicate P is true of the argument x 
 (ii) PSP:   x*∝ x & P(x*) - the relevant lower element x* left-abuts  
    (immediately precedes) x and P is true of x* 
 (iii) Scalar alternatives:  {P(x') | x'∈Alt(x)}   
      "What alternatives x' is P true of?" 
Section 2.1 discusses temporal continuative uses of noch/still like (2). In section 
2.2, I point out that different sentence interpretations arise when the particle 
attaches to something other than the main predicate of the sentence, e.g. to a 
temporal modifier. Scales other than temporal precedence are possible, and the 
resulting so-called marginal readings are analysed in section 2.3.  
2.1 Temporal continuative noch/still 
Below I provide an analysis of simple examples of temporal noch/still. The 
instantiation of (8) that is relevant for temporal scales is (9). (9) is my version of 
the semantics assigned to this use of noch/still in the literature (compare e.g. 
Löbner 1990 and Ippolito 2007).  
(9) [[noch/still <]] = λt*.λt.λP<i,t>:t*∝ t & P(t*).P(t)     (type <i,<i,<<i,t>,t>>>) 
 The scale S is temporal order "<" (type <i,<i,t>>). 
 (i)  Assertion:   P(t) - P is true of t 
 (ii) PSP:    t*∝ t & P(t*) - the relevant other time t* left- 
     abuts (immediately precedes) t and P is true of t* 
 (iii) Scalar alternatives:  {P(t') | t'∈Alt(t)}   
      "What times t' is P true of?" 
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This semantics is involved in a sentence like (2). In order to derive the intuitive 
interpretation (3) of (2), I assume the Logical Form in (10) for the example. 
(2) It is still raining.               (temporal continuative) 
(3) (i) Assertion:  It is raining. 
 (ii) Presupposition: It rained at the relevant preceding time.  
 (iii) Implicature: It might stop raining./It will stop raining.  
(10) [TP PRES [λt[φ [still< t* t] [AspP ipf [VP λe rain e]]]]] 
The particle is an adjunct to AspP, which denotes a set of times - (11) in our 
example. In order to simplify compositional interpretation, I adopt a referential 
analysis of tense (see e.g. Kratzer 1998) and assume that PRES simply denotes 
the present time interval, written as tnow. This allows us to consider the simplified 
structure in (12). We can then simply apply the lexical entry in (9) and get the 
sentence interpretation in (13). 
(11) [[AspP]] =  λt.∃e[t⊆τ(e) & rain(e)]   
   time intervals included in the run time of a rain event 
(12) Assume that PRES is simply tnow. Simplified structure:  
 [φ [still< t* tnow] [AspP ipf [VP λe rain e]]] 
(13) [[(12)]] is only defined if t*∝ tnow & ∃e[t*⊆τ(e) & rain(e)] 
 i.e. (12) presupposes that there was rain at a time immediately before now. 
 Then, [[(12)]] = 1 iff ∃e[tnow ⊆τ(e) & rain(e)] 
 i.e. (12) asserts that it is raining.  
(13) is a successful analysis of the meaning components (i) and (ii) - the 
presupposition and assertion of (2). It ensures that a period of rain began in the 
past and extends into the present, as anticipated above. See Beck (to appear) for 
some more details and discussion. There is also a meaning component concerning 
the future, (iii) in (9). I propose to give an alternative semantic analysis of this 
meaning component. I suggest that the argument, the time variable t in (9), 
triggers alternatives, (14a). Since presupposition and assertion tell us about past 
and present, the pragmatically open alternatives concern the future, (14b). 
(14) Scalar alternatives: 
 a. [[φ]]Alt = {∃e[t'⊆τ(e) & rain(e)] | t'∈Alt(t)}    Alt-trigger: time variable 
  "when is it raining?" 
 b. {∃e[t'⊆τ(e) & rain(e)] | tnow <t' }      pragm. 'open' alternatives 
  "when after now is it raining?" 
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I further propose that evoking a set of alternatives comes with an appropriateness 
constraint. This is best illustrated for questions. (15a) is odd in the context of 
(15b). I suggest that (15b) violates the constraint in (16). 
(15) a. Who passed? 
 b.   # I know that either everyone passed or everyone failed. Who passed? 
(16) Appropriateness condition on the use of a question: 
Let Q  <s,<<s,t>,t>> be a Hamblin question intension. Q is only appropriate 
in w if ∃w'[R(w,w') & ∃p[Q(w)(p) & p(w')]] & ∃w'[R(w,w') & ∃p[Q(w)(p) 
& ¬p(w')]] 
It is possible that there is a true (Hamblin) answer and it is possible that 
there is a false answer. 
There is some discussion in the literature regarding presuppositions of questions. 
Truckenbrodt (2013) proposes that they presuppose that there is a true answer. 
Abusch (2002) makes a parallel suggestion for sets of focus alternatives. The 
difference to (16) is that (16) is modalized and about both true and false answers. 
The effect of (16) in the example at hand is (17).  
(17) Appropriateness condition on noch/still alternatives: 
  It is possible that there is a time after now at which it is raining &  
 it is possible there is a time after now at which it is not raining.  
 'It might stop raining.' 
This allows us to explain the oddness of (18) (a phenomenon observed in the 
literature). If the interpretive effect of still concerned just the past and the present, 
(18) should be fine. It is odd intuitively because it raises a question about John's 
future deadness. Thus there is an obligatory meaning component concerning the 
future.  
(18)  ? John is still dead.       . 
   'John is dead and he's been dead for some time.'  (i) + (ii) 
   "What later times is he dead?'     (iii) 
In addition, there is an optional but stronger meaning component about the future. 
In the case of (2) this is the possible implicature that it will stop raining, which I 
propose to analyse as a scalar implicature. To make this transparent, I use the 
EXH operator defined (simplified) in (19). 
(19) [[EXH φ]] = 1 iff [[φ]]=1 & ∀q[q ∈[[φ]]Alt & ¬([[φ]] ⇒ q) ->¬q] 
 "All alternatives that are not entailed are false." 
 (see e.g. Krifka 1995, Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2011) 
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According to the strand of research employing the EXH operator, the example 
optionally has the LF in (20) which includes this operator. Its effect is spelled out 
in (21).  
(20) [EXH [φ [still< t* tnow] [AspP ipf [VP λe rain e]]]] 
(21) Scalar implicature: 
 ∀q[q ∈ {∃e[t'⊆τ(e) & rain(e)] | t'∈Alt(tnow) } & ¬([[φ]] ⇒ q) ->¬q] 
 = ∀t'[tnow <t' -> ¬∃e[t' ⊆τ(e) & rain(e)]] 
 "It doesn't rain after now./It will stop raining." 
This meaning component should be analysed as an implicature because it does not 
always arise and it is cancellable: 
(22) a. It is still raining, and it looks like it will continue to rain.    cancellable 
 b. Es regnet immer noch.        no scalar impl. 
  it rains always still 
  'It is raining STILL.' 
This concludes the analysis of the basic temporal interpretation of noch/still.  
2.2 Subconstituent readings 
It is interesting to note that noch/still does not occupy one fixed position in the 
syntactic structure. In examples like (23), it modifies the temporal PP 'in the 
morning' (though many English speakers do not seem to accept this option). 
(23)  Lydia ist  noch  am  Vormittag   abgereist. 
  Lydia is  still  in the morning  left 
     % 'Lydia left still in the morning.' 
This can be seen clearly in German. I apply a standard constituency test in (24), 
movement to the prefield. The relevant reading of (23) emerges in (24a) where 
noch modifies the PP and the modified PP is moved to the prefield. In (24b) the 
particle alone is moved, and the sentence is odd in the same way that (24c) is.  
(24) a. Noch  am Vormittag  ist  Lydia abgereist. 
  still   in the morning  is  Lydia left 
  'It was still morning when Lydia left.' 
 b.   # Noch  ist  Lydia am Vormittag  abgereist. 
  still   is  Lydia in the morning  left 
       # 'Lydia still left in the morning.' 
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 c.   # Noch  ist  Lydia abgereist. 
  still   is  Lydia left 
       # 'Lydia still left.' 
The oddness of (24b,c) is easily explained: The semantics of noch/still requires a 
temporal extension, but the predicate does not provide one. Thus noch/still is odd 
with achievements like 'leave', 'arrive' etc. (Such sentences are not completely 
ungrammatical; the interpretation they permit most likely is a discourse related 
reading.) 
 But back to (24a). According to this reasoning, the structure that we interpret 
is (25). The compositional interpretation is sketched in (26) and the resulting 
meaning is (27). Note that there is no presupposition regarding Lydia leaving or 
the like, which indicates the narrow scope of the scalar particle. 
(25) [TP PAST [ [λt [still< t* t [in the morning]]] [AspP pf [VP Lydia leave] ]]] 
(26) [[AspP]] = λt.∃e[τ(e)⊆t & leave(e)(L)] 
 [[ in the morning ]] = λt. morning(t) 
 [[λt [still< t* t [in the morning]] ]] = λt:t*∝t & morning(t*).morning(t) 
 [[ [λt [still< t* t [in the morning]]] [AspP pf [VP Lydia leave]] ] ]] =  
 λt:t*∝t & morning(t*).morning(t) & ∃e[τ(e)⊆t & leave(e)(L)] 
 [[PAST]] = ttopic 
 [[TP]] is defined only if t*∝ ttopic & morning(t*).  
 Then, it is true iff morning(ttopic) & ∃e[τ(e)⊆ ttopic & leave(e)(L)] 
 alternatives: { morning(t') | t'∈Alt(ttopic) } "What (later) times are in the 
morning?" 
(27) (i) Assertion:  Lydia left before noon. 
 (ii) PSP:   a relevant earlier time is also before noon. (weak) 
 (iii) scalar implicature (local): later times are not before noon.   
Additional interpretive effects may arise (e.g. the intuition that Lydia left earlier 
than expected). These are explored in Beck (to appear) and argued to arise from 
focus. I will not discuss this issue here. The important point is that the scalar 
particle has some flexibility with respect to its adjunction site. This leads to 
different overall sentence interpretations.  
2.3 Other scales 
It is well known (e.g. König 1977, Löbner 1990, Ippolito 2007) that noch/still can 
work with scales other than temporal precedence. A fairly obvious example is 
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paths, as in (28). A good context for the example would be a trip from Ipswich to 
Edinburgh on the A1. Such interpretations have been called marginal in the 
literature.  
(28) Durham is still in England.              (marginal - path) 
(29) (i) Assertion:  Durham is in England. 
 (ii) PSP:   The relevant earlier place on the path is in England. 
 (iii) Implicature: You might/will leave England after Durham. 
A version of noch/still's lexical entry (8) based on paths (see e.g. Cresswell 1978, 
Krifka 1998 for paths) is given in (30), and an analysis of the example in (31)-
(33).  
(30) [[noch/still<]] =λl*.λl.λP<l,t>:l*∝ l & P(l*).P(l)        <l,<l,<<l,t>,t>>> 
The scale < is a path with the precedence relation between locations on the 
path (type <l,<l,t>>). 
(31) a. [φ [still< l* place(Durham)] [λl [l is in England ]]] 
 b. [[(31a)]] is only defined if  l*∝ place(Durham) & l* is in England. 
i.e. (31a) presupposes a place just before Durham on the given path is 
in England. 
  Then, [[(31a)]] = 1 iff Durham's location is in England. 
(32) Scalar alternatives: 
 [[φ]]Alt = {l' is in England | l' a location on the path}  Alt-trigger: place  
 "What places on the path are in England?" 
(33) a. [EXH [φ[still< l* place(Durham)] [λl [l is in England ]]]] 
 b. Scalar implicature: 
  ∀l'[place(Durham)<l' -> l' is not in England] 
  "You leave England after Durham." 
Other so-called marginal uses involve degree scales. An example is given in (34). 
I use the version in (35) of noch/still's meaning (8). An analysis of (34) is 
sketched in (36). See Beck (2016) for more data and discussion.  
(34) 400.- Euros are still tax free.        (marginal - degree) 
(35) [[noch/still<]] = λx*.λx.λP<x,t>:x*< x & P(x*).P(x)      <e,<e,<<e,t>,t>>> 
 The scale < is a degree scale (type <d,<d,t>>) (e.g. Size, Amount,...). 
(36) a. [φ [still< x* [400,-]] [λx [x is tax free]] 
 b. (i) Assertion:    400,- is tax free. 
Beck 
150 
  (ii) PSP:     a sum below 400 is tax free. 
  (iii) Scalar implicature:  sums above 400,- are not tax free. 
To sum up the important points made in this section: noch/still is a 
presuppositional scalar particle that triggers alternatives. Its meaning is given in 
(8). This meaning is operative throughout the various uses of the particle. 
Interpretive variability of sentences with the particle arises because it can be 
adjoined in different places in the syntactic structure, and because it can operate 
on different scales.  
3 Discourse related readings - data and intuition 
This section examines the kinds of data mentioned in the introduction in which 
noch/still seems to relate to the discourse rather than to what happened. In section 
3.1, I look at order of mention sensitive noch, a use that English still does not 
share. Section 3.2 considers reaffirmative noch/still, which is available in both 
languages. I take a brief look at German additive noch in section 3.3. The 
intuitions developed in this section will be cast as an analysis in section 4, after I 
have introduced a suitable framework. 
3.1 Order of mention noch 
Returning to the discourse related uses of noch/still, let's begin with the example 
below, repeated from the introduction. The use of noch in this example is justified 
because other relevant things have been said before, i.e. Thilo has told me about 
other things he has bought.  
(7) a. context: Thilo is coming home from the supermarket. He lists a 
few things he has bought. 
 b. Sigrid:  Was  hast  Du  noch  gekauft? 
    what  have  you  still  bought 
    'What else have you bought?' 
c. Thilo: Ich  hab noch  Schokolade gekauft. (o. of mention) 
    I have  still  chocolate  bought 
    'I have also bought chocolate.'  
Further examples that contain uses of noch similarly justified by relevant other 
things said earlier are given in (37) and (38). Imagine for (37) a context in which 
your task is to describe a room. You go over all the things that you see as you 
look around the room. You have just described e.g. that on the left, there is the 
bed and a chest of drawers. This is not temporal noch (e.g. suggesting that the 
door might not be there later). Similarly, in (38), noch does not tell us that the 
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drawing has been in the manual for a while and might not be in the manual later. 
Instead, noch is used because I have made other suggestions for how to fix the 
printer earlier.  
(37) a. context: describing a room. 
 b. Auf  dieser Seite ist  noch  die  Tür.        
  on  this   side  is  still  the  door 
  'Then, there is the door on this side.' 
(38) a. context: Thilo has been trying to fix a paper jam in the printer for 
some time. I hover somewhat helplessly, trying to make suggestions. 
At one point, I say: 
 b. In der Bedienungsanleitung ist noch diese Skizze,  auf  Seite 3. 
  in the  manual          is  still    this   drawing,  on  page 3 
  There is also this drawing in the manual, on page 3.  
This use of noch is justified because other relevant propositions have been stated 
before. I propose to analyse this type of use as order of mention sensitive. I get the 
idea of order of mention from Wolfgang Klein's work, e.g. Klein (2001). The 
example in (39) (after Klein 2001) explores the use of again, whose normal 
contribution is that whatever is described in the sentence has occured before. But 
again in (39) is justified not by a sequence of eventualities ("n was a prime 
number at an earlier time"), but by what has been said before ("that n is a prime 
number was mentioned before"). 
(39) a. context: a list of numbers. 
 b. (5 is a prime number, 4 can be divided by 2, 7 is a prime number, ) 
  11 is a prime number again. 
I propose that noch in (38) is similarly sensitive to order of mention. To be more 
precise, I suggest that (38b) addresses the question under discussion (QUD) 
(Roberts 1996) "how can we fix the printer?". Noch indicates that another answer 
to this question has been given earlier. I.e. noch's contribution concerns the 
sequence of speech acts in the discourse. Its core meaning is stable, but it scopes 
above a speech act operator. This operator is called ANSWER here. I suggest the 
structure in (40) for the example. Based on the now familiar meaning of the 
particle, we can anticipate the meaning sketched in (41) for the sentence. 
(40) [[noch< p* [there is this drawing]] [λq ANSWER(q)(How can we fix...?)]] 
(41) (i)  "there is this drawing" contributes an answer to "How can we fix ...?" 
(ii)  a preceding p* contributes an answer to "How can we fix...?" 
(iii)  {p contributes an answer to "How can we fix ...?" | p∈Alt("there is 
this drawing")} 
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This captures the fact that the sentence can't be the first suggestion, i.e. (42c) is 
not appropriate in (42), similar to how the use of also in English would be 
inappropriate in this context.  
(42) a. context:  Thilo has just discovered a paper jam in the printer.  
 b. Thilo: Ooops. How can we fix this?  
 b. Sigrid:     # In der Bedienungsanleitung ist noch diese Skizze,  
    in the  manual          is  still    this   drawing,  
    auf  Seite 3.       
    on  page 3 
        # There is also this drawing in the manual, on page 3.  
3.2 Reaffirmative noch/still 
We now return to the first example from the introduction. Its salient interpretation 
is available in both English and German. I call this use of the particle 
reaffirmative; (44) provides another example. 
(43) Ich  bin  immer  noch  Deine  Mutter. (reaffirmative noch/still) 
 I  am  always still  your   mother. 
 'I am still your mother.'    
(44) 11 is still a prime number.    (reaffirmative noch/still) 
A context in which (44) could be used would be for instance a situation in which a 
student makes a mistake (like dividing 11 by 3 and getting 4). A tutor could draw 
attention to this mistake by reminding the student of the prime number status of 
11. That is, (44) can be a reminder. A first intuition is sketched in (45). Similarly, 
(43) can emphasize the continued relevance of the (known) fact that I am your 
mother.  
(45) (i) Assertion:  11 is a prime number. 
 (ii) PSP:   that 11 is a prime is "in the context". 
(46) (i) Assertion: I am your mother. 
 (ii) PSP:  It is known that I am your mother. 
 
I suggest that here, too, the particle scopes over a speech act operator. In this case, 
I take it to be Krifka's (2014) operator ASSERT. According to Krifka, ASSERT(p) 
says that the speaker is liable for the truth of p at the time of utterance. We can 
thus anticipate the meaning sketched in (48) for the structure in (47), my idea for 
the analysis of the example. Krifka (2014) briefly comments on the possibility of 
asserting a proposition that is not a new assertion. He suggests that this can 
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increase salience of existing commitments and/or reinforce commitment to 
assertion. My proposal is this is marked explicitly by noch/still in the 
reaffirmative use. 
(47) [ still [ASSERT [I am your mother]]]] 
(48) (i) I am liable for the truth of "I am your mother" at t. 
(ii) At a preceding time t* I have been liable for the truth of "I am your 
mother". 
 (iii) {I am liable for the truth of "I am your mother" at t' | t'∈Alt(t) } 
3.3 Additive noch (Umbach 2009) 
In this section I discuss another use of the German particle noch which has been 
argued (Umbach 2009) to be an instance of order of mention as well. Let's first 
look at some relevant data. It has been observed (Umbach 2009, Klein 2007/2015) 
that sentences like (49) can have different interpretations depending on where the 
focus is. This is indicated by capitalization in (49) (from Umbach 2009). In 
particular, stress on the particle brings out the additive reading. So-called further-
to noch is analysed in Beck (to appear). I concentrate on additive noch here. 
(49) a. Hans trank  noch  einen  SCHNAPS. (further-to noch) 
  Hans drank still  a   schnaps 
  'Hans had a schnaps before... 
 b. Hans trank  NOCH  einen Schnaps.  (additive noch) 
  Hans drank still   a   schnaps 
  'Hans had (yet) another schnaps.' 
 
On the additive reading, noch forms a constituent with the NP. That is, the 
particle modifies a subconstituent, not the main predicate of the sentences. This is 
demonstrated in (50) using once more movement to the prefield (the context 
(50a,b) is given to provide suitable discourse circumstances for the structure).  
Accordingly, the structure for additive noch should look roughly like (51). The 
meaning of the particle lets us anticipate (52) as the meaning of such a structure. 
 (50) a. Hans had a schnaps. 
 b. What did he drink then? 
 c. Noch einen Schnaps  hat  er  getrunken. 
  Still a  schnaps  has  he  drunk 
  'He had another schnaps.' 
(51) [[noch< x* x [einen Apfel]] [1[ ich schäle t1]]] <e,<e,<<e,t>,t>>> 
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(52) (i)  Assertion: There is an x such that x is an apple and I peel x. 
 (ii) PSP:  For some x*: x* is an apple and x*<x. 
Note that this involves an ordering of individuals. What would be a plausible 
scale in this instance? Umbach (2009) argues that the scale relevant for additive 
noch is order of mention. The order of mention relation < holds between type <e> 
expressions "x*<x" here (not propositions as in the earlier examples). We can 
make sense of this if the context includes not just propositions but also discourse 
referents, as in dynamic semantics (e.g. Heim 1982). Order of mention can be 
defined on both, (53).  
(53)  "x*<x": 
 < is order of mention i.e. x* occurs in an earlier context than x 
 Hence (59) is appropriate in a context in which apples were introduced into 
 the discourse. 
 
I will not pursue additive readings further in this paper. See Umbach 2009 for 
more discussion. This section indicates that my general approach is compatible 
with her analysis. It is interesting that order of mention might be a source of 
additivity, in addition to event cumulation (Greenberg 2010, Thomas 2010). 
4 Framework and analysis 
In Section 3, I have argued that an interpretive framework is needed in which 
speech act operators are present, and can be outscoped by compositional semantic 
material. Section 4.1 introduces such a framework. In Section 4.2, I collect some 
motivation from the literature that supports this type of theory. In Section 4.3, I 
apply it to the problem at hand, discourse related readings of noch/still.  
4.1 Sketch of a framework: Krifka 2014 
There is some recent work that argues that illocutionary operators are represented 
in the Logical Form, and that certain expressions can take scope over them. 
Manfred Krifka has made this point in various papers, and Sauerland & 
Yatsushiro (2015) also argue for it. I present here an analysis that is based on 
Krifka 2014, although it is much simplified. Krifka locates speech act operators in 
head of ForceP at LF, for example: 
(54) [ForceP   [Force'  [Force ASSERT] [IP ...]]]  
He assumes, and I follow him in this, that the speech act operator changes the 
semantic type from propositional to functions from contexts to contexts. Let <c> 
be the type of contexts. Then up to the level of IP, we have the familiar 
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propositional meanings. The head of ForceP turns them into discourse active 
meanings, here: functions from contexts to contexts <c,c>. 
(55) IP:    <s,t> 
 head of ForceP:  <<s,t>,<c,c>> 
    ASSERT  
    also ANSWER, orders, declarations, ... 
A context c is an n-tuple <csp, ch, ct, Cw...> that consists of the speaker csp, the 
hearer ch, the utterance time ct, the common ground Cw and probably more (this is 
ignored here). This is the utterance situation. Cw (the common ground) is the set 
of worlds compatible with the assumptions of the participants. Given this, the 
semantics of the ASSERT operator can be sketched as follows: 
(56) ASSERT(p)(c) = ιc':  c'=<csp, ch, ct, Cw ∩{w: csp is liable in w for the truth of 
p in w at ct}> 
The operator combines with a proposition and a context and maps them onto a 
new context which is just like the old one except that the common ground is 
updated with the information that the speaker is liable for the truth of the 
proposition. An assertion of "11 is a prime number", for example, has the 
structure in (57b) yielding the interpretation in (58). This amounts to (59). 
(57) a. 11  is a prime number. 
 b. [ForceP   [Force'  [Force ASSERT] [IP 11 is a prime number]]]  
(58) λc. ASSERT([λw. 11 is a prime number in w])(c)  (type <c,c>)  
(59) λc.ιc':c'=<csp, ch, ct,  
 Cw∩{w: csp is liable in w for the truth of [λw'.11 is a primew'] in w at ct}> 
At this point I will make an important simplification. The operators considered in 
this paper only change the common ground. We will not model turn taking and 
the like. So nothing will ever affect the speaker, hearer etc. parameters of the 
context. I therefore simplify the output context c' as a set of worlds, type <s,t>. 
The simplified version of (59) is given in (60), and the simplified ASSERT in (61).  
(60) λc.λw.w∈Cw & csp is liable in w for the truth of [λw'. 11 is a prime 
 numberw'] in w at ct 
(61) ASSERT(p)(c) = λw.w∈Cw & csp is liable in w for the truth of p in w at ct 
This is the framework I adopt. An important question one should have at this 
point is why we put the speech act operator in the LF at all. Shouldn't this be the 
pragmatic step? I.e. shouldn't this be the effect of uttering a syntactic structure, 
and not part of the structure itself? The next section provides some motivation.  
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4.2 Motivation (Krifka 2014, Sauerland & Yatsushiro 2015) 
Somewhat surprisingly, recent research at the semantics/pragmatics interface has 
shown that illocutionary acts can occur embedded. A collection of examples and 
informal paraphrases of their relevant interpretations is given below. Krifka 
(2001) argues that universal quantifiers, for example, can take scope above 
question speech acts, declarations and imperatives. Krifka (2014) argues that tell 
embeds an assertion. It seems, then, that certain expressions can type shift to types 
useable above the speech act operator. This leads to embedded speech acts. An LF 
for (62b) is sketched in (63). 
(62) a. What did everyone buy? 
  For each x, tell me what x bought. 
 b. Everyone leave! 
  For each x, I order x to leave. 
 c. Mary told John that his shirt and tie didn't match. 
Mary made an assertion with the content that his shirt and tie didn't 
match. 
(63) [ForceP everyonex [Force' IMP [IP x leave ]]] 
 
More directly relevant for our purposes is the example in (64) of an adverb 
scoping above an assertion (from Krifka 2014). The example is analysed as 
having the structure in (65). The adverb needs to have the semantics in (66) for 
the interpretation of this structure. Thus it needs to shift from its normal type as a 
VP modifier, exemplified in (67), to this discourse related type. Both times, the 
adverb adds the not-at-issue information that whatever happened was frank. 
(64) Frankly, your shirt and tie don't match. 
 "Your shirt and tie don't match, and making this assertion is frank." 
(65) [ForceP frankly [ForceP ASSERT [IP your shirt and tie don't match ]]] 
(66) [[frankly]] = λR.λc.λw:frank(R(c)(w)).R(c)(w)   <<c,c>,<c,c>> 
(67) a. Mary told John frankly that his shirt and tie didn't match. 
 b. [[frankly]] = λR.λe:frank(R(e)).R(e)            <<v,t>,<v,t>> 
Another type of example that is fairly closely related to our data is remind-me 
readings of questions, as brought to our attention by Sauerland and Yatsoshiro 
(2015). They observe that the question in (68) has a reading that is not about a 
changing name. As the paraphrases indicate, the use of again is motivated instead 
by the fact that the name has been known before. 
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(68) What was your name again?      (remind me) 
 "Bring it about that I know again what your name is." 
 "You must make it once more known what your name is." 
The paraphrased interpretation suggests the structure in (69), which is Sauerland 
& Yatsushiro's analysis.  
(69) [ForceP IMP [ again [ForceP CG [CP what was your name?]]]] 
To see what this means, interpretations for the speech act operators IMP and CG 
are sketched in (70). Roughly speaking, IMP (the imperative) contributes "you 
must" and CG (for common ground) needs to contribute "make it known". 
Importantly, the adverb again needs to have a discourse level type interpretation 
(type <<c,c>,<c,c>>) for the LF to be interpretable. 
(70) a. IMP(p)(c)(w):  
  ∀w' [ w' ∈Cw & ch obeys in w' the requests made by csp in w -> p(w')] 
 b. CG(Q)(c)(w): 
  ch makes known in w the answer to Q in w 
In sum, the field has accumulated a body of evidence that indicates that speech act 
operators can be in the scope of other material in the sentence, motivating a 
framework like Krifka's (2014) (see his paper for more data and discussion).  
4.3 Back to our examples 
Let us now use this framework in the analysis of the discourse related uses of 
scalar particles, that is, let's spell out the ideas sketched in section 3. I begin with 
the reaffirmative uses of the particles. Remember that the basic idea for an 
analysis of (71) is that the particle takes scope over ASSERT.  Such an LF is 
presented in more detail in (72a). Its interpretation is (72b). (73) spells out the 
resulting sentence meaning.  
(71) 11 is still a prime number.    (reaffirmative noch/still) 
(72) a. [λc [ForceP still c* c [ForceP ASSERT [IP 11 is a prime number]]]]    <c,c> 
 b. λc.λw. ASSERT(λw'.11 is a prime number in w')(c*)(w) & c*∝c.  
    ASSERT(λw'.11 is a prime number in w')(c)(w) 
(73) a. [[(72)]] is only defined if csp is liable for the truth of '11 is a prime 
number' at c*t and c*t ∝ ct.Then [[(72)]] is true if csp is liable for the 
truth of  '11 is a prime number' at ct. 
 b. c*∝c iff c*t∝ct 
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The interpretation relies on a suitable version of noch/still's lexical entry, which is 
provided in (74). A type shift from regular temporal noch/still (repeated in (75)) 
must be available that yields this interpretation. Note that it adjusts the types but 
keeps a stable core contribution.  
(74) reaffirmative noch/still is discourse level temporal noch/still: 
 [[noch/still <]] = λc*.λc.λP<c,c>.λw:c*∝ c & P(c*)(w).P(c)(w)  
         (type  <c,<c,<<c,c>,c>>>>) 
(75) [[noch/still <]] = λt*.λt.λP<i,t>:t*∝ t & P(t*).P(t)        (type <i,<i,<<i,t>,t>>>) 
Next, let's take a closer look at order of mention noch. This also requires a 
discourse level meaning for the particle, but it is not the same as (74). In (76), I 
repeat the chocolate example.  
(76) Ich  hab  noch  Schokolade gekauft.   (order of mention) 
 I  have  still  chocolate  bought 
 'I have also bought chocolate.'  
Working out the proposal from section 3 in more detail, the LF is (77) and the 
interpretation (78)-(79).  
(77) [ForceP [still< p* [I have bought chocolate]] [ λq [ForceP ANSWER(Q)(q) ]] 
(78) a. QUD Q: what did you buy? 
 b. ANSWER(Q)(p): p is offered as an answer to Q  
 b'. ANSWER(Q)(p)(c)(w) is only defined if p∈Q or there is a q: p=>q and 
q∈Q. Then: ANSWER(Q)(p)(c)(w) = 1 iff w∈Cw &  csp is liable in w 
for the truth of p in w at ct. 
 c. scale <:  p<q iff p was mentioned before q,  
    i.e. if ANSWER(Q)(p)(c*) and ANSWER(Q)(q)(c) and c*<c 
(79) [[(77)]] is only defined if there is a p*: p* is offered in answer to the QUD 
and p* was uttered before 'I have bought chocolate'  ; i.e. p*<I have bought 
chocolate 
 
This is assuming that a version of noch is available that ranks propositions 
according to order of mention. (80) provides a suitable lexical entry. There is a 
parallel between order of mention noch and marginal noch/still in that these two 
readings transfer noch's continuative interpretation from the time scale to some 
other scale. In (80) this is combined with a discourse operative interpretation.  
(80) order of mention noch: 
 [[noch <]] = λp*.λp.λR.λc.λw:p*<p & R(p*)(c)(w).R(p)(c)(w)  
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To summarize the analysis, I follow earlier proposals that there is a speech act 
operator in the head of ForceP at LF. This operator changes semantic types to 
discourse operative meanings. Certain expressions can shift from normal 
propositional meanings to such discourse level interpretations, and can therefore 
scope above speech act operators. Among those expressions is noch/still on 
reaffirmative and order of mention uses. This is responsible for discourse related 
readings of scalar particles.  
5 Constraints on discourse related interpretations 
The preceding section has added some further data points in favour of the 
primarily surprising idea that compositional material can outscope speech act 
operators. In this section, I want to explore briefly what the limits of this 
possibility are. I open a window to a bigger discussion we should have in section 
5.1. Section 5.2 notes that discourse related interpretations of scalar particles 
depend on particular lexical items. In section 5.3, we observe that they are subject 
to contraints on scope. Section 5.4 investigates if discourse related interpretations 
are a root clause phenomenon.  
5.1 A question of generality 
We have seen a number of case studies that support embedded illocutionary 
operators. Before taking a closer look at those particular possibilities and their 
constraints, I would like to make a general note that the phenomenon of 
embedded illocutionary acts needs to be severely constrained. In general terms, 
this is part of the research agenda of Krifka (2014, 2016). With regard to adverbs, 
let me contrast the possibilities we observed above with some impossibilities. 
Krifka (2014) notes (81). But other adverbs/particles with a similar type of 
meaning resist such uses; contrast (81) with (82): 
(81)  Frankly, I admire Sue.        
  'My assertion that I admire Sue is frank.' 
(82)    # Reluctantly, I admire Sue. 
'My assertion that I admire Sue is reluctant (I'm forced to admit it).' 
A parallel point can be made for remind-me readings. Remember (83) and note 
that in German, noch can also bring out this interpretation. Sauerland and 
Yatsushiro (2015) point out that the adverb again is special in being able to take 
this scope position. A parallel reading is not possible for additive particles, as 
indicated in (85). I would like to add (86) to this list of impossibilities. 
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(83) a. Wie  war  noch/wieder  Ihr  Name? 
  how  was  still/again   your  name 
  'What was your name again?' 
 b. Bring it about that I once more/still know your name. 
(84) a. [ForceP IMP [ again/wieder/noch [ForceP CG [ what is your name? ]]]] 
b. All acceptable worlds are such that you do something which causes 
the answer to 'what is your name?' to be once more/still known. 
(85)       # What is your name, too?  (Sauerland & Yatsushiro 2015) 
  (not licensed e.g. by someone else announcing their name) 
(86) a.    # Wie  war  fast   Ihr  Name? 
  how  was  almost your  name 
       # What was almost your name? 
 b. Bring it about that I almost know your name = Give me a hint. 
This means that the shift to a type that can scope over a speech act operator is not 
freely available. If it were, we would expect way more discourse related 
interpretations than are actually available. 
5.2 Lexical constraints 
But back to the expressions that are of particular interest to us here. The following 
sets of data indicate that the availability of a discourse related interpretation 
depends on the particular lexical item. In (87), I show that near synonymous 
adverbs/adverbials resist parallel uses: 
(87) a.    # Wie  war  erneut  Ihr  Name? 
  how  was  anew  your  name 
  'What was your name again?' 
 b.   # Wie  war  zum   zweiten  Mal  Ihr  Name? 
  how  was  for the  second  time  your  name 
       # 'What was your name for the second time?' 
(88)         # [ForceP IMP[erneut/for the 2nd time [ForceP CG[what is your name? ]]]] 
So there are certainly lexical constraints involved. This is compatible with a type 
shifting analysis like the one developed in the preceding section. But it would be 
interesting to know when a lexical item can and cannot shift. The data in (92) 
bring to mind the Visibility Parameter for adverbs (Rapp & von Stechow 1999, 
Beck 2005) where a similar difference in possible adjunction sites for wieder vs. 
erneut is observed. 
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 (89) and (90) draw attention to the fact that English still is not exactly like 
German noch with respect to discourse related readings: 
(89) a.   # I have still bought chocolate. 
 b.   # [ForceP still [ForceP ANSWER [IP I have bought chocolate]]]]  
(90) a.   # What was still your name? 
 b.   # [ForceP IMP [ still [ForceP CG [ what is your name? ]]]] 
This is despite the fact that a discourse related interpretation of still is in principle 
possible, cf.  example (1). It seems that which operator is scoped over matters. 
While still can shift to a type that allows it to take scope over ASSERT, cf. (75), it 
does not seem to be able to scope over e.g. ANSWER in (89), that is, (80) is not 
available for English still.  
5.3 Scope constraints 
Sauerland and Yatsushiro (2015) also explore constraints on readings that involve 
embedded speech act operators. They note in particular that there are scope 
constraints on the availability of remind-me readings. (91) is their data set. The 
quantifier 'fast keiner' ('almost no one') is known to block other elements in the 
clause from taking wide scope. The contrast between (91a) and (91b) indicates 
that this is relevant for the availability of the remind-me reading. On the remind-
me reading, nochmal needs to take wide scope, but the quantifier in contrast to the 
referential subject blocks this. (91c) shows that a different word order permits the 
remind-me reading. This is expected because the quantifier no longer intervenes 
between nochmal and its scope position.  
(91) a. Welche Sprache  kann  er  nochmal  sprechen?  
  which  language  can  he  again  speak 
  'Which language does he speak again?'   (remind me) 
 b.   # Welche  Sprache  kann  fast      keiner  nochmal  sprechen? 
  which  language  can  almost no one again  speak 
  'Which language does almost no one speak again?' (#remind me) 
 c. Welche  Sprache  kann  nochmal  fast   keiner  sprechen? 
  which  language  can  again  almost no one  speak 
  'Which language does almost no one speak again?' (remind me) 
In (92) I transfer Sauerland & Yatsushiro's argument to reaffirmative noch. In 
(92b) the negative quantifier prevents the reaffirmative reading. A different word 
order (92c) permits the reaffirmative reading.  
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(92) a. Ich  bin  immer  noch  Deine  Mutter. (reaffirmative) 
  I  am  always  still  your   mother 
  'I am still your mother.' 
 b.   # Niemand hier ist  immer  noch Deine Mutter. (#reaffirmative) 
  nobody  here is  always still   your   mother 
  'Nobody here is still your mother.' 
 c. Es  ist  immer noch niemand hier  Deine Mutter. (reaffirmative) 
  it  is  always still   nobody   here your   mother 
  'It is still the case that nobody here is your mother.' 
These data support a structural analysis of remind-me and reaffirmative readings: 
only a scope analysis lets us expect that the phenomenon is sensitive to scope 
constraints. This in turn supports a structural analysis of speech act operators.  
5.4 Are discourse related readings a root phenomenon? 
Given that the analysis of reaffirmative and order of mention noch/still involves 
these particles taking scope above a speech act operator, we would expect these 
uses to show up only in clauses that express speech acts (thanks to David Beaver 
(p.c.) for emphasizing this point).  This might suggest that the readings should 
show up unembedded only, since root clauses is where speech acts can be 
expressed. But remember that according to Krifka (2014), clauses that express 
speech acts are not limited to root clauses; tell for instance receives an analysis 
according to which it embeds an assertion. So this prediction is not quite as easy 
to follow up on as one might first think, because it is not the same as checking 
whether or not the particles on these uses can show up embedded. It depends on 
the embedding context whether or not we expect the discourse related readings to 
be there.  
 To illustrate, a reaffirmative reading under tell should be ok, while perhaps 
embedding under forget should not lend itself to such a reading.  
(93) a. She told me that she was still my mother. 
'She made an assertion that conveyed continued commitment to her 
being my mother.' 
 b. She forgot that she was still my mother. 
       # 'She forgot that she continued to be liable for the truth of her being 
my mother.' 
Similarly, remind-me readings in embedded questions should depend on whether 
a question speech act is embedded or an interrogative that contributes a 
proposition that answers the question: 
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(94) a She asked me what my name was again. 
  'She wanted to be reminded of my name.' 
 b. Whether I can introduce you depends on what your name was again.  
      # 'Whether I can introduce you depends on you bringing about  
  that it is once more known what your name is. 
A conditional is an embedding context in which the then-clause does not normally 
constitute a speech act. But an 'Austinian conditional' like (95) which constitutes a 
conditional speech act (Krifka 2014) is compatible with a reaffirmative reading. 
(95) If anyone is interested: I am still your mother.    (reaffirmative) 
At first glance, it seems that embedded remind-me and reaffirmative readings 
correlate with contexts that are plausibly analysed as embedded illocutionary acts. 
This issue certainly needs to be explored further.  
6 Conclusion 
I have proposed an analysis of discourse related uses of the scalar particles noch 
and still which is based on a stable semantic core of the particle. The special 
interpretive effect comes about because on these readings, the particle scopes 
above speech act operators. In the case of the reaffirmative reading, it scopes 
above a normal assertion operator. In the case of the order of mention reading, it 
scopes above an answer operator. These analyses support the approach taken in 
e.g. Krifka 2014 and Sauerland and Yatsushiro 2015, according to which certain 
expressions can take scope over an illocutionary operator. 
With regard to the analysis of scalar particles, this paper contributes to the 
idea that one core meaning is responsible for the various uses of the particle 
(pursued in Beck (to appear), Beck 2016). It might prove a starting point for a 
detailed analysis of additive uses of noch and an interesting angle for the 
semantics of modal uses of still, as in (96a) and especially (96b). 
(96) a. John studied all night, but he still failed the exam. (Ippolito 2007) 
 b. You might have a point. But still, Jones is simply our best striker. 
In more general terms, the analyses pursued here have interesting repercussions 
for our understanding of the semantics/pragmatics interface. According to the 
analyses in section 4, there is some semantic composition above the speech act 
operator - in particular some adverbs can be interpreted there. Suppose that based 
on these findings, we give up the idea of a strictly modular interpretive 
component. Then we are looking for a theory of when outscoping a speech act 
operator is and isn't possible. What we can say right now is that such a theory 
would need to include a lexical and a scope component.   
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